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In many health care systems primary care physicians act as ‘gatekeepers’ to secondary 
care.  We investigates the impact of the UK fundholding scheme under which general 
practices could elect to hold a budget to meet the costs of elective surgery for their 
patients.  We use a differences in differences methodology on a large four year panel 
of English general practices before and after the abolition of fundholding.   
Fundholding incentives reduced fundholder elective admission rates by 3.3% and 
accounted for 57% of the difference between fundholder and nonfundholder elective 
admissions, with 43% a selection effect due to unobservable differences in practice 
characteristics.  Fundholding had no effect on emergency admissions. 
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The physician ‘gatekeeper’ is one of the most common features of managed health 
care.  The gatekeeper has a dual role, simultaneously acting as an expert clinical agent 
on behalf of the patient, and a rationing agent on behalf of the payer for care 
(employer, government, or other insurer).  Gatekeepers are found in almost all health 
care systems, examples being various forms of US managed care and the UK system 
of general practitioners. 
 
The incentives offered to gatekeepers seek to balance their two roles.  Without 
countervailing pressures gatekeepers might make heavy use of health services for 
their patients in order to demonstrate professional excellence and attract and retain 
patients.  The negative consequences of any ‘overuse’ are likely to be small compared 
to the costs to the physician of ‘underuse’ amongst her patients.  Funders of health 
care have therefore experimented with incentives for gatekeepers to reduce demands 
by their patients.  The most ubiquitous is capitation, under which the gatekeeper 
receives a fixed – possibly risk-adjusted –sum for each enrolled patient.  The 
gatekeeper must then bear some or all of the risk associated with variations in 
expenditure from the budget formed by the sum of her capitation payments.  The 
sanctions for overspending might range from a modest threat of a utilization review, 
through to earnings being 100% at risk for any amount overspent.   
 
Effective policy requires information on the responses of gatekeepers to the different 
types of budgetary regimes. In this paper we present evidence from a recent large 
natural experiment in the English National Health Service on the effects of 
confronting gatekeepers with an explicit budget and prices for care received by their 
patients. 
 
The UK National Health Service (NHS) has a long tradition of general practitioner 
(GP) gatekeeping.  All NHS patients must be registered with a GP, and - other than in 
an emergency – no NHS patient can gain access to secondary care without a referral 
from a GP.  A patient’s GP also acts as the main gateway for securing access to 
pharmaceuticals. There has been a tradition in the UK of low rates of referral to 
secondary care and low pharmaceutical usage relative to other developed nations. 
  1 
In 1991 the UK government introduced a split between purchasers and providers of 
health care in the NHS (UK Government, 1989).  Health Authorities (HAs), 
geographically defined entities covering on average initially about 300,000 citizens, 
became the main purchasers of health care.  The providers of secondary care 
(principally hospitals) were termed NHS Trusts and were removed from the direct 
control of HAs.  They remained within the public sector but were required to compete 
for contracts from purchasers in what was known as the NHS internal market. 
 
As part of the1991 reforms larger general practices could elect to become fundholders 
(Glennerster et al, 1994).  Fundholding practices became responsible for purchasing 
some elective (non-emergency) procedures from local providers. They were given an 
annual budget by their local Health Authority to do so. The HA thus  delegated part of 
its budget and purchasing responsibility to those of its general practices that chose to 
become fundholders.   
 
Fundholders could retain any budget surplus for spending on services to patients. 
Budget deficits were often made good by HAs, and there were limits on the maximum 
cost per episode, so that the financial regime was not unduly demanding for 
fundholding practices.  Although a fundholder surplus could not be used for direct 
payment to the practice partners, it could be used to pay for enhancements to the 
practice’s premises, which might yield capital gains that could be realized when the 
premises were sold.  By 1997 over 50% of the population was registered with a 
fundholding general practice, and their expenditure accounted for 15% of NHS 
expenditure on secondary care (Audit Commission, 1996). 
 
A change of national government in 1997 led to a further major reform of the NHS 
(UK Government, 1997).  Part of the rationale were criticisms of the fragmentation, 
inequalities in treatment and high managerial costs allegedly brought about by 
devolved purchasing in the form of fundholding.  No new fundholders were allowed 
from April 1998 and fundholding was abolished in April 1999. New organisations, 
Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), in which primary care professionals (particularly GPs) 
were intended to play a central managerial role, became the main purchasers of health 
  2care.
1 All practices had to join their local Primary Care Trusts. PCTs are formally 
responsible for health care in a geographically defined area, though their populations 
(around 150,000) are the populations of their constituent practices (typically 
numbering around 20 to 25).  
 
The introduction of the internal market was never subjected to rigorous evaluation.  
Indeed the UK government at the time consciously rejected the need for co-ordinated 
evaluation, and claimed that calling on the advice of academics for such purposes was 
a sign of weakness (Robinson and Le Grand, 1994).  A review of the evidence to 1998 
by Le Grand, Mays and Mulligan (1998) suggests 
1. Compared with non-fundholding practices, GP fundholders appear to have 
secured a relatively slower growth in pharmaceutical costs, at least in the early 
years of fundholding (Baines et al, 1997; Gosden and Torgeson, 1997). 
2.  GP fundholders received generous budgets relative to GPs covered by health 
authority contracts, and fundholders experienced few serious sanctions for 
overspending (Dixon et al, 1994; Audit Commission, 1996). 
3.  Geographical proximity, perceived quality and long term relationships seem to 
have been the principal criteria for GP choice of provider, rather than prices 
charged (Mahon et al, 1994;  Baines and Whynes, 1996; Propper et al, 1998). 
4. Patients of GP fundholders may have secured favourable waiting times in 
comparison with patients of non-fundholders (Dowling, 2000; Goodwin, 1998). 
5. The evidence on the effect of fundholding on practice admission rates was 
inconclusive. 
 
Methodological problems have bedevilled attempts to evaluate the behavioural impact 
of the introduction of fundholding.  Because of government opposition to evaluation 
the studies that were done tended to be small scale, to lack adequate controls and to be 
difficult to generalise.  The major problem was selection bias:  because fundholding 
was voluntary it was difficult to disentangle the effect of the financial incentives of 
fundholding from the unobservable characteristics of the practices that could 
                                                 
1 Initially in April 1999 Primary Care Groups were introduced as subcommittees of their local HA but 
it was intended that they would progress to become separate legal entities as PCTs.  By April 2002 all 
PCGs had become PCTs and HAs were abolished. 
  3influence both their referral rates and their decision to become fundholders.  There is 
evidence that fundholders, especially early wave fundholders, were different from 
non-fundholding practices (Baines and Whynes, 1996).  Some of these differences, 
such as the mean age of the GPs in the practice, are observable in administrative data 
sets but others, such as the strength of entrepreneurial attitudes are not (Whynes et al, 
1999). 
 
Two studies of the effect of fundholding on admission rates have attempted to deal 
with selection bias.  Gravelle et al (2002) examined practice admission rates for 
cataract surgery in a large HA with 109 practices and allowed for endogenous 
fundholding status in two ways.  They used an ordered logit model to estimate the 
probability that a practice would become a fundholder of a given wave and then used 
the predicted probabilities in the admission rate equation.  They also estimated a 
selection equation for fundholding status and added the resulting Mills ratio to the 
admission rate equation.  Both methods yielded similar results to OLS models: 
fundholding practices had significantly lower admission rates.   Attempts to compare 
the change in behaviour of practices becoming fundholders with those which 
remained non-fundholders were not successful because they had only three years of 
data and only a small number of practices became fundholders during the period. 
 
Croxson et al (2001) used a four year panel of data on 58 practices in a different HA. 
Their prime aim was to examine whether fundholders had gamed the budgetary 
system.  The budget for a fundholding practice was set by applying standard prices to 
the practice’s elective admissions in the period immediately before it became a 
fundholder.  This created an incentive for fundholding practices to increase their 
admission rates in the year before they become fundholders.  Croxson et al (2001) 
compared the change in admission rates for fundholders on becoming fundholders 
against the change in admission rates of non-fundholders and established fundholders, 
thereby reducing the likelihood of selection bias. They found that there was indeed 
evidence that fundholders increased their admission rates in the year prior to 
becoming fundholders and reduced them in their first year of fundholding.  The study 
clearly demonstrates that fundholding practices responded to the financial incentives 
in the budget setting process. However, it did not address the question of whether the 
  4fundholding financial regime caused changes in the behaviour of practices after the 
preparatory and first year of fundholding. 
 
We use the opportunity offered by the abolition of the voluntary fundholding regime 
and its replacement by the compulsory PCT regime to examine the effect of budgetary 
regimes on the behaviour of fundholding practices. We have a newly constructed data 
set including information on admissions for over 7000 practices (fundholding and 
non-fundholding) for the two years before (1997/8, 1998/9) and the two years after 
(1999/2000, 2000/1) fundholding was abolished. In December 1997 practices were 
given a clear signal that fundholding was to be ended in April 1999, and – unlike the 
situation when fundholding was introduced – GPs had a good understanding of the 
implications of the policy change. The fact that the 50% of practices which were 
fundholders had to switch from the fundholding regime to the PCT regime means that 
the difference in differences methodology has a greater chance of identifying the 
effect of the change in budgetary regimes compared with studies based only on data 
from the fundholding period when the numbers switching financial regimes in any 
year was much smaller. Furthermore, by 1997 data sources had improved
2 so that it is 
possible to examine the admission rates of fundholder and non-fundholder practices 
on a national basis, rather than within single HAs.  
 
We set out a simple model of practice decisions on admission rates under the 
fundholding, non-fundholding and PCT budgetary regimes in section 2.  We use the 
model to generate a set of hypotheses and to discuss the assumptions which enable the 
difference in differences methodology to identify the effects of the budgetary regimes 
on fundholding practices.  Section 3 describes the data and discusses the methods. 
Results are presented in section 4 and section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
2 Prior to 1997/8 Hospital Episode Statistics, which contains details of all patient admissions in 
England, did not have a field for the practice with which the patient was registered.  Such information 
was held locally at HA level. 
  52  GPs and budgets 
2.1  A model of budgetary regimes 
We assume that GPs care about the number of patients a from their practice admitted 
for elective surgery and also about the income y their practice receives from the NHS.  
Income can be used for GPs’ personal consumption or to provide additional patient 
services that are not directly funded by the NHS. We do not need to consider the 
division of practice income between these uses. 
  
The practice utility function is quasi-linear 
        ( , , , ) ( , , ) , 0, 0, 0 aa a u y azy h az kh h h θθ θ θθ =+ − < > >            (1) 
z is a temporal shift variable. k is a cost associated with the budgetary regime. It 
includes transaction costs and any distaste felt by GPs under the fundholding regime 
about having to make explicit tradeoffs between income and elective admissions. 
Transaction cost under regime j is kj.  j = F indicates that the practice is a fundholder 
in 1997/8 and 1998/9, j = NF that it is not a fundholder in those years, and j = T that it 
is operating under the PCT regime (all practices in 1999/2000, 2000/1). We assume 
that fundholding has higher transaction costs: kF > 0 = kNF = kT.  
 
Practices have heterogeneous preferences with respect to the costs of the budgetary 
regime and patient benefits. We capture heterogeneity by a single parameter θ  in 
such a way that practices with higher θ  have higher admission rates under a given 
budgetary regime but have a higher lump sum transaction cost under fundholding.  
Practices with higher θ  are therefore more likely not to be fundholders in 1997/8 and 
1998/9 and to have higher admission rates conditional on the budgetary regime.   
Hence part of the difference between fundholder and non-fundholder admission rates 
is due to selection.  
 
We can derive the model from the more epidemiologically orientated notion of the 
practice referral threshold.  GPs refer patients for outpatient appointments with a 
hospital specialist. Referred patients are seen by the hospital specialist after a delay of 
some weeks and the specialist then decides whether to admit the patient.  If she does 
so the patient is placed on a waiting list for elective surgery before being admitted. 
  6(See Lindsay and Feigenbaum, 1984; Gravelle et al (2002) for fuller models of the 
process.)  
 
In this paper the distinction between referrals and admissions is ignored and it 
assumed that all referred patients are admitted.  We normalise the exogenous number 
of patients who consult to 1.  A cost of c is incurred when a patient attends an 
outpatient clinic at the hospital to be placed on the waiting list for elective surgery. 
Treatment is received after a waiting time of w and produces a gross benefit of 
bz θ ++
a
, where b is the patient specific component of the benefit which has 
distribution function G(b) (density g(b)) over the population of consulting patients.  If 
the practice refers all patients whose specific benefit exceeds the referral threshold b  
the number referred a and the referral threshold are negatively monotonically related, 
with   and b ,   .  
o
1 ( )
o G b =−
o ()
o ba = / 1/ ( )
oo ba g b ∂∂ = −
 
With a wait of w, the total benefit from patients who are referred is  
[
()( )exp( )
o ba hb z r w c θ
∞
=+ + − − ∫ ] d G (,,) ha z   θ =      (2)   
with 
          ( 3 )   [ ( ) ]exp( )
o
a hb a z r w θ =+ +− c −
GP marginal utility from admissions is positive at small a but eventually declines to 
zero and becomes negative as the health gain from the marginal referred patient 
declines. Hence the practice indifference curves are U-shaped in (a,y) space, as in 
Figure 1. 
 
Non-fundholding practices faced an implicit budget.  The budget for all elective 
admissions for non-fundholding practices was held by their Health Authority. The HA 
could buy admissions for its non-fundholders under a “cost and volume” which 
stipulated a price p for marginal variations in admissions around the contracted for 
planned volume for the HA.  Since the HA had a fixed budget, additional expenditure 
on elective admissions meant less expenditure on other activities.  The opportunity 
costs of additional admission of a patient from a practice would be spread over all 
practices and patients in the HA. We capture the attenuation of incentives by 
assuming that marginal savings or additional expenditure on elective admissions for 
  7non-fundholders were shared equally by all nHA practices (fundholders and non-
fundholders) in the HA. There were about nHA = 100 practices in each HA in 1997/8 
and 1998/9, so the effective price confronting non-fundholders  / NF HA p pn =  was very 
low.  If a practice had no patients admitted its full income was  yNF.  Practice income 
under the implicit budget constraint for non-fundholders was  NF NF yp a − .   
 
Under the PCT regime after the abolition of fundholding, PCTs made contracts with 
providers for all elective admission from their practices.
3 The contracts were similar 
to those made by HAs for elective admissions from non-fundholding practices. With 
nT practices in the PCT, and assuming the difference between planned and actual 
expenditure on electives is shared equally across practices in the PCT, the implicit 
price for elective admissions is pT = p/nT.  In our data set a typical PCG/T had nT = 21 
practices in 1999/00.  The practice’s full income with no admission under the PCT is 
yT = yNF. 
 
The fundholding regime gave the fundholder an additional explicit budget BF to 
purchase elective admissions at the explicit fundholder price pF.  Fundholding   
practice income was   if  FF N FFF yy p ay B p =− = +− a FF B pa ≥ . Fundholders who 
overspent their budget did not have to pay for the additional admissions so that the 
marginal price for such admissions was the very much lower implicit price pNF facing 




The practice’s optimal choice of admissions under budgetary regime j = F, NF, T is 
*(, , j ap z ) θ , giving the practice an optimised utility  . With the benefit 
function (2), admissions are decreasing in the price p
*(,, , ) jj upy z θ
j and increasing in the taste and 
temporal parameters θ  and z.   
                                                 
3 Although it was the intention that PCTs would introduce ‘notional’ budgets for hospital care at 
practice level linked to financial incentives (Department of Health, 1997), very few PCTs introduced 
such practice budgets in the first three years of the PCT regime (Dusheiko et al, 2002).   
4 Fundholders also did not have to pay for elective cases which cost more than £6000 but we ignore this 
complication in the modelling since it affected a very small proportion of admissions. 
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The explicit budget for fundholders was set so that it was sufficient to buy the number 
of admissions for the fundholder in the last period before they became a fundholder 
(Dowling, 2000; Croxson et al, 2001). Thus
*(,, , FN F N F ) B pa p y z θ = , where we 
assume that the price facing fundholders is the same as the price paid by the HA and 
the PCT for marginal elective admissions.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the optimal choices aNF,  aF,  aT under the non-fundholding, 
fundholding and PCT regimes. The temporal shift factor z is held constant in the 
figure. The additional budget for fundholding gives the practice, which chose aNF as a 
non-fundholder, a budget line through aNF with slope − p and intercept yF on the 
income axis.  Because the practice utility function is linear in income the effect of the 
transaction cost of fundholding can be shown as an inward parallel shift of the budget 
line so that its intercept is  F yk F θ − . The practice’s optimal choice under the 
fundholding regime is aF which is less than under the non-fundholding regime 
because it faces a higher price and there are no income effects.  
 
Elective admissions from practices under the PCT regime will be less than under the 
non-fundholding regime because PCTs have fewer practices than HAs, so that the 
financial gains from a reduction in admissions are shared across fewer practices and 
the implicit price is higher:  pT > pNT.  Hence the abolition of fundholding will reduce 
the admission rate from practices which were not fundholders, unless the effect on 
implicit prices is regarded as negligible by practices. With no income effects the 
abolition of fundholding will increase the demand from ex-fundholding practices.   
 
There are two reasons why the argument that practices under the fundholding regime 
faced higher prices and hence would have fewer admissions than under the non-
fundholding regime may be incomplete.  The first is that, either because of gaming by 
fundholders (Croxson et al, 2001) or because the budget setting process was rough 
and ready, practice fundholding budgets could be more than sufficient to purchase 
their previous level of elective admissions. It has also been suggested, though the 
evidence is mixed (Goodwin, 1998; Dowling, 2000), that fundholders received overly 
generous budgets, especially in the early years of the scheme in order to encourage 
  9more practices to become fundholders. With quasi-linear preferences overly generous 
budgets do not alter the conclusion that the fundholding regime will have fewer 
admissions.  But if admissions are a sufficiently strongly normal good, admissions 
may be higher.  Given the very large difference between the explicit fundholder price 
and the implicit prices under the other regimes it seems implausible that the income 
effects of inaccurate budgets would offset the substitution effects.
5  
 
The second reason why fundholding could lead to more admissions is that they could 
purchase care of higher quality than non-fundholders. In particular it has been 
suggested that the patients of fundholding practices had lower waiting times for 
elective care  (Propper et al, 2002).  From (3)  we have  aw h =   
< 0 and so lower waiting times lead to higher admissions.  The difference in waiting 
times for patients of fundholders in our data is about 5%.  The literature on waiting 
times suggests that the elasticity of admissions with respect to waiting times is of the 
order of  − 0.3 to − 0.2)  (Gravelle et al, 2002; Gravelle et al, 2003; Martin and Smith, 
1999).  It is seems unlikely therefore that the reduction in waiting times could reverse 
the price effect for fundholders.  We include practice waiting times in our estimated 
admission models so that the estimated effect of the fundholding regime allows for 
any difference in waiting times and therefore reflects the incentive effects of the 
explicit prices faced by fundholders. 
[ ]exp( )
o rb z r w θ −+ + −
 
 
2.2  Measuring the effect of budgetary regimes with observational data 
2.2.1 Identification   
Although it seems plausible that the fundholding regime led fundholders to reduce 
admission rates compared with the non-fundholding and PCT regimes, establishing 
the magnitude of the effect from observational data requires some care because of 
potential selection bias and transitional effects.  Suppose that there are two GP 
preference types with θ θ < . Those practices with θ  have optimal choices aNF, aF, 
                                                 
5 Fundholders also received an additional expense allowance to cover some of the administrative costs 
of fundholding, such as the hiring of practice managers.  Such a reduction in the transaction costs of 
fundholding will increase the likelihood that a practice will become a fundholder. 
  10and  aT under the non-fundholding, fundholding and PCT regimes and choose to 
become fundholders in 1997/8 and 1998/9: 
** (,, , ) ( , , , FF N FN F y z up y z ) up θ θ > . In 
Figure 1 they choose aF in 1997/8 and 1998/9 as fundholders and aT in 1999/2000 and 
2000/1 under the PCT regime. We do not observe them choosing aNF.    
 
Practices with θ  have indifference curves (not shown) which are steeper negatively 
than type θ  practices and choose higher admission rates  , NF T aa ′ ′  under the non-
fundholding and PCT regimes. Under the fundholding regime they are offered a 
nominal budget line through  .  They would have transaction costs of  NF a′ F k θ  under 
fundholding and would choose aF ′  on their real fundholding budget line. Type θ  did 
not choose to become fundholders: 
* (,, , ) ( , F F NF upy z up z θ <
* , , NF y ) θ
F
. Hence we do 
not observe  .    F a′
 
Selection bias means that a cross sectional comparison of fundholders and non-
fundholders is flawed because it confounds differences in incentives and in tastes.  
The observed difference between the admission rates of fundholders and non-
fundholders ( FN aa ′ − ) overstates the unobserved effect of fundholding on the 
behaviour of practices which chose to become fundholders: (aF – aNF). 
 
A temporal comparison of the admission rates of fundholders before and after the 
abolition of fundholding can potentially identify the effect on fundholding practices of 
changing the budgetary regime from fundholding to PCTs. Thus in Figure 1, where 
we assumed that z was constant over time, we could examine  T aa F − .   But in general 
a before and after comparison of fundholders may be confounded by changes in other  
factors affecting admission rates. Examples of such factors include government 
policies to increase the supply of elective surgery to reduce waiting times 
(Department of Health, 1998), and initiatives like NHS Direct (George, 2002) and 
Walk In Centres (Salisbury et al, 2002) to improve access to care.  The before and 
after temporal comparison of fundholding practices 
* ) (, , TA ap z θ
*(, , FB ap z θ − )  
confounds the effect of the budgetary regime on the fundholding practices with the 
effects of the change in z before and after the budgetary regime change. 
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To remove the bias from selection and from temporal factors we compare the change 
in the admission rates of fundholders and non-fundholders before and after the 
abolition of fundholding: 
** ** (, ,) (, ,) (, ,) ( , ,) TA FB TA N FB ap z ap z ap z ap z θθ θ θ   ∆= − − −    
)
   (4) 
If, as in our model in section 2.1, the temporal shift parameter has the same additive 
effect on both types of practice  
*(, , j ap z θ  =             ( 5 )
then 
**(, ) j ap z θ +
** ** ** ** (, ) (, ) (, ) ( , ) TF T N F ap ap ap ap θ θθ   ∆= − − −   θ       (6) 
Difference in differences is usually employed to identify the effect of treatment on the 
treated when there are only two regimes (treated, not treated) (Blundell and Costa 
Dias, 2000).  Here there are three regimes since both the fundholders and non-
fundholders have regime changes after the abolition of fundholding. Thus the standard 
assumption of additive and identical temporal effects is insufficient to identify the 
effect on fundholders of fundholding compared either with the PCT regime or with 
the non-fundholding regime.   
 
If we also assume that the difference between the non-fundholder and PCT budgetary 
regimes has a negligible effect on the type θ  who chose not to become fundholders:  
** ** (, ) ( , NF T ap ap ) θ θ = .            ( 7 )  
then  
** ** (, ) (, ) TF ap ap θ θ  ∆= −            ( 8 )  
identifies the effect of the change from fundholding to PCT regimes on type θ  who 
chose to become fundholders.  
 
Alternatively, we can assume, as in our model, that the difference between the non-
fundholder and PCT budgetary regimes for type θ  who become fundholders is the 
same as the difference between those regimes for type θ  who do not become 
fundholders:  
** ** ** ** (, ) ( , ) (, ) ( , NF T NF T ap ap ap ap ) θ θθ −= − θ     (9) 
  12If (5) and (9) hold then difference in differences identifies the effect on fundholders of 
fundholding compared to non-fundholding: 
** ** (, ) ( , NF F ap ap ) θ θ ∆= −                     (10) 
 
The implicit cost borne by a practice when it has an additional patient admitted under 
the PCT or non-fundholding regimes is greater the smaller the number of practices in 
the PCT or the HA.  Although we do not observe 
**(, NF ap ) θ , we examine the effect 
of the number of practices in the PCT on the admission rates of ex-fundholders and 
ex-nonfundholders to test whether (7) or (9) hold.  If the number of practices has no 
effect on the admission rates of ex-nonfundholders then (7) holds. If nonfundholders 
are price responsive and have a lower admission rate when the implicit price increases 
then the difference in differences will overestimate the effect on fundholders of the 
effect of fundholding relative to the PCT regime.
6   
 
If the number of practices in the PCT has the same effect on the admission rates of 
both types of practice then (9) holds. If ex-fundholders are more price responsive than 
ex-nonfundholders, then the difference in differences will be an underestimate of the 




2.2.2  Transitional effects  
We estimate a linear difference in differences model of the admission rate of practice i 
in period s as 
44
22
is i is s s i s s i is
ss
aD F D F α ωδ γ
==
′ =+ + + + + ∑∑ β x ε
                                                
                 (11) 
where Fi = 1 if practice i is a fundholder (zero otherwise) , Dt = 1 if s = t (zero 
otherwise), and x is a vector of covariates (from waiting times to practice population 
characteristics).  We have four years of data: years 1 and 2 are the pre-PCT period 




1 (, ) ( , ) NF T ap apθ θ − φ =  we have 
** **
1 (, ) (, ) TF ap ap θ θ φ ∆ =−+     
7 
** ** ** **
2 (, ) ( , ) (, ) ( , ) NF T NF T ap ap ap ap θ θθ θ −= − φ +  implies 
** **
2 (, ) ( , ) NF F ap ap θ θ φ ∆ =− −     
  13estimation methods are described in section 3. Here we use (11) to discuss the testing 
of the implications of the theoretical model with our panel of observational data. 
  
 
We expect that estimated  0 δ <
is
 but cannot interpret it as the effect of the difference 
between fundholding and non-fundholding regimes because of the unobservable taste 
variables incorporated in ε  which affect referral decisions and the decision to 
become a fundholder. The estimated difference in difference parameters  23 ,, 4 γ γγ are 
not affected by selection bias and do provide information about of the effect of change 
from the fundholding to PCT regimes on practices which were fundholders.  With 
instantaneous adjustment to regime changes the model predicts 
2 0; 0 δ γ <<= 34 γ γ <=                       (12) 
 
However, there are likely to be transitional effects which alter the predictions about 
the difference in difference parameters  234 ,, γ γγ .  
 
Uncertain waiting times.  The relevant price for admissions is the price ruling at the 
date of admission, not the date of referral. The mean wait for elective admission in our 
data set is 110 days.  Hence some of the admissions in one year are the results of 
decisions in the previous year which were based on beliefs about the budgetary 
regime which would prevail when the referred patient was admitted. If patient waiting 
times were certain and practices could forecast the future budgetary regime, patient 
admissions in a year would be determined by the budgetary regime in that year.  But 
patient waiting times are highly variable within practices.  The probability that a 
referral in one year would be admitted in the following year increases through the 
year.  The expected price   for fundholders in the last year of fundholding was less 
than p but more than p
Ep 
T = p/nT and declined throughout the year. Fundholders would 
increase their referral rates in 1998/9, the last year of fundholding, especially towards 
the end of the year.  Some of the referrals in 1997/8 would be admitted in 1998/9, so 
that the admission rate in the last year of fundholding would be greater than in the 
penultimate year 1997/8. 
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decisions taken in the last year of fundholding when fundholders were faced with 
expected prices    Ep  (/ ,) T p np ∈ , and decisions taken in the first post fundholding 
year when faced with  p/nT. The admission rate for ex-fundholders in the first post-
fundholding year would be greater than in the last year of fundholding but less than in 
the second post fundholding year.  We expect 
23 0 4 δ γγγ << < <                       (13) 
A comparison of the last year of fundholding and the first year of PCTs would tend to 
understate the effect of the regime change on fundholders.  The full effect of the 
regime change on fundholders requires a comparison of the penultimate year of 
fundholding and the second year of the PCT regime and is given by  4 γ  
 
Deferred referrals.  The anticipated end of fundholding gave fundholders an incentive 
to delay referrals so that the patient would be admitted in the post fundholding period 
at the much lower post-fundholding price.
8  Referrals in the last fundholding year 
would be reduced and those in the first post fundholding year would be increased.  
Admissions in the last fundholding year would therefore fall relative to the previous 
fundholding year. The deferred patients would increase admissions in the first post-
fundholding year. Hence, ignoring the waiting time effect discussed above 
  24 0, 0 3 δ γγ << < < γ
4
        ( 1 4 )    
 
Fundholder balances.  After the end of fundholding in April 1999 ex-fundholding 
practices were allowed to keep their accumulated fundholding surpluses to be spent 
over the following four years. Thus even in the last two years of fundholding 
fundholders still had an incentive to reduce elective admissions in order to accumulate 
surpluses.   The anticipated ending of the fundholding regime increased the marginal 
opportunity cost of admissions for fundholders in the last year of fundholding. Hence 
fundholding practices would reduce admissions in the last year of fundholding 
compared with previous years.  If this was the only transitional effect 
   23 0, 0 δ γγ << < = γ
                                                
       ( 1 5 )  
 
8 A suggestion by Barry McCormick. 
  15Early wave fundholders were funded more generously and would have had more time 
to accumulate balances than late wave fundholders. Hence the ending of fundholding 
is likely to lead to a bigger reduction in admissions from 1997/8 to 1998/9 by late 
wave fundholders compared with early wave fundholders. 
 
If all three transitional factors operated the prediction is that 
  23 0, 0 or 0, 0, 0 4 δ γγ << >>> γ       ( 1 6 )  
Comparisons of the last year of fundholding and the first post fundholding year will 
not identify the equilibrium effect of fundholding on fundholder admission rates 
because of the transitional incentives created by the anticipated end of fundholding. 
To achieve this we need to focus on the comparison of 1997/8 with 2000/01. Pairwise 
comparisons between 1997/8, 1998/9 and 1999/00 are, however, not without interest 
in that they may show whether and how fundholders responded to the transitional 
incentive effects. 
 
3  Data and Methods 
 
3.1 Data 
Data were collated from three main sources: Hospital Episodes Statistics for 
admissions, General Medical Statistics for practice characteristics and the database 
assembled for the AREA project (Sutton et al, 2002) for socio-economic 
characteristics and provider characteristics. Detail are in the Appendix.  Table 1 gives 
summary statistics for the set of variables included in the final models. Table 2 shows 
the distribution of practices by fundholding wave and their admission rates for the 
four years 1997/8 to 2000/1. 
 
3.2 Dependent  variable 
The dependent variable was the crude practice admission rate: total practice 
admissions divided by practice population. Demographic effects were allowed for by 
including the age and sex proportions of the practice population as explanatory 
variables. The procedure is more flexible than direct or indirect standardisation and 
does not require recomputation of the dependent variable when the observation set 
  16changes.  We included the total practice population as a regressor in an attempt to 
allow for measurement errors in the denominator of the dependent variable.    
  
3.3  Variable selection  
By including covariates we increase the precision of the estimates of the effect of 
fundholding since the decision to become a fundholder was correlated with observable 
characteristics of the practice as well as unobservables. Many of the potential 
covariates are highly correlated and estimates of the fundholding effects were 
insensitive to the choice of covariates.  The selection of covariates was made taking 
into account an initial factor analysis of the explanatory variables, variance inflation 
factors (Fox, 1997), and results from the AREA project cross section analysis of the 
determinants of 2000/1 ward level admission rates (Sutton et al, 2002).  
 
3.4 Estimation  procedures 
We used STATA Version 7 to estimate a variety of panel data models: pooled OLS, 
fixed effects, random effects and population averaged. The pooled OLS,  population-
averaged and fixed effects estimators were all estimated with robust standard errors. 
The pooled OLS estimates and the fixed effects estimates allow for within-group (GP 
practice) correlation of the errors over time using the ‘cluster’ command. The 
estimated population averaged and the random effects models assume that the within 
group correlation in the error term is a scalar that is identical across groups and 
constant over time. The population averaged (PA) estimator is a general linear model 
for panel data (Liang and Zeger, 1986) and is asymptotically equivalent to the random 
effects estimator (Stata, 2001). It produces coefficient estimates very close to those 
from random effects models. The PA estimator yields robust standard errors which do 
not rely on the assumption of homoskedasticity in the RE estimator.  
 
The OLS models include HA effects as a means of allowing for unobserved HA level 
effects which could arise either from the possibility that supply variables may be 
endogenous (Gravelle et al, 2003b) or because of HA level variations in the quality of 
population and admission data. We also separately include provider effects (captured 
by a dummy variable for a practice’s main provider) to allow for unobserved provider 
effects arising from provider admission policies or from provider level data entry 
quality variations. 
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The fixed effects model does not yield estimates of the effects of the many time 
invariant explanatory variables. We therefore also estimate a within and between 
population averaged model that uses the within practice four year mean and the yearly 
deviations from the within practice four year mean for the time varying variables 
(waiting time, practice population and list size per GP) instead of their yearly 
observations.  The procedure produces coefficients on the time varying variables 
which are identical to those from the fixed effects estimator and estimates of the time 
invariant coefficients which are consistent without the need for the assumption 
underlying the random effects estimator that unobserved heterogeneity across groups 
is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.   
 
Initial functional form tests using Box-Cox transformations of the dependent variable 
and the PE test of the linear versus log linear models (Greene, 2000) led us to choose 
a linear model. We report results for the pooled OLS, fixed effects and population 
averaged procedures since the random effects and population averaged models gave 
very similar results and the random effects models failed Hausman tests, suggesting 
that explanatory variables were correlated with unobservable practice effects. 
 
3.5  Testing the identifying assumptions 
3.5.1  Differential time trends: elective and non-elective admission rates 
The difference in differences method rests on the assumption that unobserved 
temporal factors have the same effects on fundholding and non-fundholding practices.  
We attempted to test for differential trends by comparing difference in differences 
models for elective and non-elective (emergency) admissions. Non-elective 
admissions for fundholding procedures were not charged to fundholders. Comparing 
the differences in differences for emergency admissions against those for electives 
gives a version of the “difference in difference in differences” procedure (Blundell 
and Costa Dias, 2000).  If some of the temporal factors affected fundholders and non-
fundholders differentially but had the same effect on fundholder elective and non-
elective admissions then the difference in difference in differences will identify the 
incentive effect of the fundholding regime on the fundholders. We therefore estimated 
a model of non-elective admissions and compared the difference in differences 
  18coefficients with those from the elective model. More formally, we also estimated a 
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) model of elective and emergency admissions 
and tested the restrictions that the difference in difference coefficients were the same 
in both equations. 
3.5.2  Responses to implicit prices 
We argued in section 2.2 that the difference in differences coefficients would identify 
the effect on fundholders of the fundholding regime relative to the nonfundholding 
regime if the difference in the implicit price of elective admissions between the 
nonfundholding and PCT regimes had the same effect on the admission rates of 
fundholders and nonfundholders.  Alternatively, and less plausibly, if nonfundholders 
are not affected by the difference in the implicit prices between the nonfundholder and  
PCT regimes, then the difference in difference methodology identifies the effect on 
fundholders of the fundholding regime relative to the PCT regime. We also suggested 
that the implicit price would be inversely proportional to the number of practices in 
the primary care organisation (HA in 1997/8 and 1998/9, PCT in 1999/2000 and 
2000/1) since the costs of additional admissions would be spread over all practices 
under the nonfundholding and PCT regimes. Accordingly, we attempt to test if the 
identifying assumptions hold by including the reciprocal of the number of practices 
and its interaction with a fundholding dummy in cross section OLS models of the 
admission rates in the penultimate year of fundholding and the second year of the 
PCT regime. These years are unlikely to be affected by transitional effects and by 
estimating single cross sections for each year we are able to allow for clustering by 
including HA effects in the model for 2000/1 and PCT effects in the model for 
1997/8. Including HA effects in the model for 1997/8 which also includes the 
reciprocal of  the number of practices in the HA will lead to perfect multicollinearity 
and similarly for the inclusion of PCT effects in the model for 2000/1. 
 
3.6  Robustness to data quality 
3.6.1 Observation  selection 
After linking the data we had an initial unbalanced four year panel of 30422 
observations from 7606 practices. Figure 2 is a scatter plot of elective admissions 
against practice populations using all four years of observations.  It is clear that there 
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admissions and the patient registration system count of practice populations. We 
cumulatively dropped (a) 101 practices with less than 1000 patients in any year (the 
median practice population is over 5900; (b) 740 practices with less than 30 elective 
surgical admissions in any year; (c) 14 practices with crude elective admission rates 
over 200 per 1000 in any year (the median admission rate was about 60 per 1000).  
This step greatly reduced both the skewness of the distribution of admission rates 
(from 2.91 to 0.41) and the kurtosis (from 48.78 to 4.40);  (d) we wanted to include 
the Low Income Scheme Index (LISI) score as an explanatory variable as it is one of 
the few socio-economic variables measured at practice level without attribution.   
Although the LISI is only measured for practices with populations of 1000, not all 
such practices had a LISI score. Restricting the sample to practices with a LISI score 
led to a further 46 practices being dropped and yielded the balanced panel of 28420 
observations on 7105 practices used for most of the estimations. 
3.6.2 Admission  data 
Although there are known to be inaccuracies in the HES data (Audit Commission, 
2002; Department of Health 2003c) the main issue for our investigation is whether 
they are systematically related to the budgetary regime.  Thus suppose that providers 
make random errors in attributing admissions to practices. Fundholding practices 
which checked their recorded admissions had an incentive to query overcounts but not 
undercounts. Under the non-fundholding regime practices had no incentive to check 
their recorded admissions and if they had done so they had no more incentive to query 
overcounts than undercounts.  Hence in 19987/9 and 1998/9 fundholders may have 
had their admission rates undercounted relative to non-fundholders.  Under the PCT 
regime after fundholding was abolished ex-fundholders have no more incentive to 
check recorded admissions than ex-nonfundholders and hence data error will not lead 
to an undercount for ex-fundholders relative to ex-nonfundholders. It is therefore 
possible that some of the differences, and some of the difference in differences, 
between fundholder and non-fundholder admission rates is the result of biased 
measurement rather than the effect of the budgetary regimes on admissions.  
 
The incentive for bias in the reporting of admissions ceased immediately when 
fundholding was abolished. Thus we would expect to see an immediate increase in the 
  20recorded admission rates of ex-fundholders in the first post fundholding year 
1999/2000.  One test for whether fundholding had an effect on admissions rather than 
on recorded admissions is to compare the difference in difference parameter between 
2000/1 and 1997/8 ( 3 γ ) with that between 1999/2000 and 1997/8 ( 4 γ ).  We argued in 
section 2.2.1 that effects of the abolition of fundholding on admission rates were 
likely to be only fully observed by the second post-fundholding year 2000/1.  Hence if 
3 0 4 γ γ << at least part of the effect of fundholding on recorded admission is due to 
its effect on admissions rather than its effect on recording.  
 
We also attempted to allow for biased measurement more directly. The quality of 
provider HES data inputting varies across providers (Department of Health, 2000) 
suggesting that any measurement bias will also vary across providers.  First, we 
included a set of provider dummies in the regressions to capture unobservable data 
quality. Second, we measured the data quality of each provider as the proportion of its 
HES surgical admissions records which contained missing or invalid entries, weighted 
the proportion by the share of a practice’s admissions accounted for by the provider 
and summed over all providers for each practice to get a practice level measure of  
provider data quality. The practice level data quality variable was then entered in the 
admission equation.  Third, we divided our sample of practices on the basis of 
whether the above measure was below 20% in any year and estimated the difference 
in difference model separately on the two sub samples.  
3.6.3  Practice population data 
We had practice population data for all four years derived from practice patient lists. 
It suffer from list inflation: the total population on practice lists exceeds the best 
estimates of the English population by about 4% (Sutton et al, 2002).  Most of the 
models reported in the paper are based on the time varying uncorrected practice 
populations but also include Health Authority dummy variables to capture some of the 
effects of differential list inflation.  We also had list inflation corrected population 
data for one year (2000/1) which deflated practice populations by applying separate 
age, sex and local authority specific correction factors to practice populations. We 
used the data to estimate models with the admission rate calculated from constant but 
list inflation adjusted populations. 
  214 Results 
4.1 Effects  of  budgetary  regimes 
Table 3 reports a variety of OLS, FE and population averaged difference in 
differences models using our preferred set of observations. Figure 3 plots the 
predicted (conditional mean) differences between fundholders and non-fundholders 
from the coefficients of the within and between population averaged model in Table 
3, together with 95% confidence intervals. 
 
The estimated effects of fundholding are very similar across the different estimation 
methods and there is no obvious pattern to differences across estimators: 
•  fundholders had lower admission rates than non-fundholders in 1997/8 
(between 2.53 and 3.50 per 1000 compared with a mean rate over all practices 
over 4 years of about 61.5); 
•  they further reduced their admission rates, relative to non-fundholders, in the 
last year of fundholding (1998/9), though the difference in differences is quite 
small (-0.44 to -0.66) and is only significant at the 5% level in the OLS and 
PA models which include Health Authority effects; 
•  fundholders significantly increased their admission rates relative to non-
fundholders in the first PCT year (difference in differences vary from 1.09 to 
1.27);  
•  fundholders further increased their admission rates relative to non-fundholders 
in the second PCT year (difference in differences vary from 1.78 to 2.05) . 
 
Fundholders had lower admission rates than non-fundholders in 1997/8 though not all 
of the difference can be attributed to the incentive effects of fundholding. Adding the 
difference in difference coefficient for 2000/01 relative to 1997/8 to the 1997/8 
difference between fundholders and non-fundholders provides an estimate of the 
difference between fundholder and non-fundholders in 2000/01. All models suggest 
that ex-fundholders had lower admission rates than ex-nonfundholders in 2000/01 
when both types were faced with the same budgetary regime.  
 
Using the estimates from the within and between PA model we see that about 43% 
(3.4399 – 1.9573)/3.4399) of the difference between the elective admission rates of 
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and 57% to incentives.  The incentive effect, the difference between admission rates 
in 2000/1 and 1997/8 divided by the four year mean fundholder admission rate, was 
3.19%.  
 
The time pattern of the difference in difference coefficients suggests that comparison 
of the last year of fundholding and the first year of the PCT regime does not yield an 
estimate of the long run effects of the change in the budgetary regime.  The estimated 
pattern suggests that all three of the transitional effects discussed in section 2.2.2 were 
operating.  The reduction in fundholder admission relative to nonfundholders in the 
last year of fundholding (1998/9) is evidence against uncertain waiting times being 
the only cause of transitional effects since this would imply that fundholder admission 
rates would be increased relative to those of nonfundholders because of the reduction 
in the expected price of admissions in 1998/9 relative to 1997/8.  Hence either the 
deferral or fundholder balance transitional effects must also have been operating.  
 
The fact that the difference in difference for 1999/2000 relative to 1997/8 was smaller 
than that for 2000/1 relative to 1997/8  suggests that the deferral of admissions to the 
first post fundholding year cannot be the whole explanation. It is suggests that though 
fundholders may have wanted to reduce admissions in the last year of fundholding in 
order to accumulate balances they were unable to predict precisely when referred 
patients would be admitted. The pattern of difference in difference coefficients is best 
explained as a combination of the three transitional effects. 
 
Previous studies found evidence that early and late wave fundholders differed in their 
observed and unobserved characteristics (Baines and Whynes, 1996; Whynes et al, 
1999) and responded differently to budgetary regimes (Gravelle et al, 2002).  Table 4 
has the fundholder effects for the seven waves of fundholders from a within and 
between PA model (not reported).  For all fundholder waves, except the last (1997/8) 
wave, the difference in difference coefficients shows that fundholders increased their 
admission rates relative to non-fundholders between the penultimate year of 
fundholding and the second year of PCTs.  However, the incentive effects of 
fundholding, defined as the difference in admission rates between 2000/1 and 1997/8 
divided by the four year mean admission rate, were larger for the first four waves.  
  23Fundholding led to a weighted average reduction of 6.15% in elective admissions for 
wave 1 to 4 fundholders compared with a reduction of 1.20% for wave 5 to 7 
fundholders.  The overall weighted average fundholder incentive effect when waves 
are distinguished is 3.30%, compared with the estimated incentive effect when waves 
are not distinguished of 3.19% (Table 3, model 5). 
 
4.2  Other factors affecting admission rates 
 
The coefficients on the other covariates in Tables 3 are generally plausible. Elective 
admission rates are reduced by Waiting time,  Access NHS and by distance to 
substitute private providers (Distance private).  The elasticity of admissions with 
respect to waiting time (calculated from the fixed effect model at the variable means) 
is   which is comparable, though somewhat smaller, to other studies (Gravelle 
et al, 2002; Gravelle et al, 2003a; Martin and Smith, 1999). Only Consultants has a 
counter-intuitive (negative) coefficient, though in the OLS model with provider 
effects, which may allow for possibly confounding effects of provider admission 
policies, the coefficient has a more plausible positive sign. 
0.103 −
 
All models have a negative association of total practice population on admission 
rates. Practice population enters the denominator of the dependent variable and we 
interpret the negative coefficient as evidence of measurement error in practice 
populations rather than a genuine effect of practice size.  The negative coefficient on 
the Single handed GP dummy variable is perhaps a better indicator of possible size 
effects on admission rates. 
 
Practices with younger GPs or more UK qualified GPs have higher admission rates.  
Practices with more minor surgery or which are training practices have lower 
admission rates. The latter effect may be picking up an effect of practice quality on 
practice admission thresholds.  The negative effect of practice dispensing may be in 
part due to the fact that one criterion for GPs to be allowed to dispense medicines is 
that patients live more than a certain distance from their surgery. Thus the variable 
may be an indirect indicator of rurality and access to secondary providers.  
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Allowance, Education Deprivation) have positive effects on admissions, probably 
reflecting both higher morbidity amongst the poor and the greater use of private health 
care amongst the more affluent and better educated.  The negative coefficient on the 
deprivation measure Job seekers may be due to the concentration of such allowances 
amongst the younger, and hence generally healthier, population. The negative 
association between the Non white proportion and admission rates is in line with other 
studies and probably reflects lower use at given levels of morbidity (Sutton et al, 
2002; Gravelle et al, 2003b) .  The negative coefficient on In Migration is evidence of 
a selection effect operating at area level: the healthy are more mobile.  The negative 
coefficient on Rural patients may reflect the effects of poorer access in rural areas. 
 
4.3  Testing identifying assumptions 
4.3.1  Differential time trends: elective and non-elective admissions 
There were no financial incentives for fundholders to reduce admission rates for non-
elective procedures since they were not charged for them. Indeed it has been 
suggested that fundholders attempted to have patients on the waiting list for elective 
fundholding procedures admitted as emergencies (Paton, 1995), though the evidence 
is contradictory (Goodwin, 1998).  If fundholders had been able and willing to reduce 
elective admissions by increasing non-electives then we would expect to find that the 
temporal pattern of difference in difference coefficients for non-elective admissions 
was the opposite of that for elective admissions. In particular the difference in 
difference for 2000/1 relative to 1997/8 for non-electives should be negative. 
 
Table 5 reports a variety of models of non-elective admissions in the same specialities 
and procedures as the elective models.  There are fewer significant explanatory 
variables in the non-elective admission rate models but the pattern of non budgetary 
regime coefficients is very similar.  Elective waiting times have a significant negative 
effect but the magnitude of the effect is very much smaller than for the elective 
admissions whereas the other supply variables have effects which are of comparable 
magnitude for electives and non-electives. 
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similar: the fundholding effect and the difference in difference coefficients are all 
very small (the mean non-elective admission rate over the four years is 23.97 per 
1000) and insignificant.  Figure 3 plots the estimated differences between the 
admission rates for fundholders and nonfundholders over the four years from a 
between and within population averaged model (not reported here).   
 
We also estimated a seemingly unrelated difference in differences regression model 
for elective and non-elective admissions. The results are in the last two columns of 
Table 5.  The coefficients in the elective admissions model are similar to those for the 
OLS model in Table 3.  In particular there is a significant negative effect of 
fundholding in 1997/8 and significant difference in difference coefficients for 1998/9 
(negative), 1999/2000 (positive) and 2000/1 (positive).   
 
We compared the difference in differences coefficients between the elective and non-
elective models as a form of difference in difference in differences test for the 
possibility that the significant difference in difference effects in the elective model are 
due to differential time trends between fundholders and nonfundholders.  In the SUR 
model the restriction that there is no difference between elective and non-elective 
difference in differences coefficients is not rejected for 1998/9 (χ
2(1) = 1.83, p = 
0.176) but is rejected for 1999/2000 ((χ
2(1) = 6.03, p = 0.014) and for 2000/1 (χ
2(1) = 
19.79, p = 0.000).  Figure 3 also shows that there is essentially no change in the 
difference between fundholder and nonfundholder non-elective admission rates over 
time, in contrast to the clear reduction in the difference for elective admission rates 
after the end of fundholding.  Thus the difference in differences for elective 
admissions do not appear to be due to time trends having the same effect on a 
practice’s elective and non-elective admission rates but differing effects between 
fundholder and nonfundholder practices.  The figure also does not provide any 
evidence that fundholders responded to the financial incentive to substitute 
emergencies for electives. 
4.3.2  Implicit prices  
Table 6 reports attempts to test the identifying assumptions (7) and (9) by estimating 
cross section models including the reciprocal of the number of practices in the HA or 
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theoretical model predicts that the number of practices in their HA should have no 
effect on their admissions whilst nonfundholders’ admission rates would be smaller in 
HAs with fewer practices. Thus in the model for 1997/8 we expect a negative 
coefficient on the reciprocal of the number of practices and a positive coefficient on 
its interaction with the fundholding dummy. Both coefficients are negative in 1997/8 
but their t statistics are very small so that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
number of practices had no effect on admissions in 1997/8.  
 
In 2000/1 the implicit price facing all practices, whether ex-fundholders or ex-
nonfundholders, is inversely related to the number of practices in their PCT so that the 
theoretical model predicts that both types of practices will have lower admission rates 
in PCTs with fewer practices. The results for 2000/1 are compatible with the 
prediction in that both the coefficient on the reciprocal of the number of practices and 
that on its interaction with the fundholding dummy are negative: the implicit price 
variable has a larger negative effect on ex-fundholders than fundholders.  This is not 
implausible but if the coefficient on the implicit price variable was significant it 
would suggest that identifying assumption (7) is violated. If the coefficient on the 
interaction term was significant then we could reject the identifying assumption (9). 
Neither coefficient is significant though that on the implicit price variable is 
considerably larger (−1.39). than that on the interaction (−0.44). We believe that the 
difference in difference coefficient for 2000/1 relative to 1997/8 in the models 
reported earlier are identifying the effect on fundholders of the fundholding regime 
relative to the non-fundholding regime and that, if anything, the effect is 
underestimated by the difference in difference. 
 
4.4  Robustness to data quality 
4.4.1  Exclusion of observations  
Table 7 shows the effect of the cumulative exclusion of observations in a fixed effect 
model of elective admissions.   The pattern of difference in difference coefficients is 
similar across all five observation sets, especially for the final year of fundholding 
(1998/9) and the second year of the PCT regime (2000/1).  After dropping practices 
with populations under 1000 the results suggest that fundholders significantly 
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year of PCTs.   
 
There were no obvious differences, apart from the exclusion criteria and the 
proportion of fundholders, between included and dropped practices. Fundholders 
accounted for 41% of dropped practices, compared with 49% in the final sample. This 
was to be expected since one of the criteria for dropping practices was a recorded 
practice size of less than 1000 and the minimum size requirement for fundholders 
never fell below 5000. The fact that 16% of the 55 practices dropped for this reason 
were fundholders is further evidence of inaccuracies in the population data and 
supports the omission of small practices from the analysis. 
4.4.2  Admission data quality 
In Table 8 the first two sets of results are from OLS and FE regressions with the data 
quality variable.  Practices using providers with better quality data have lower 
admission rates, which is to be expected since data quality is defined in terms of 
missing entries (see section 3.6.2). However, the effects of fundholding are very 
similar to those in the Table 3.  We also divided practices according to whether their 
providers had good or poor data and estimated FE models on each set of practices.  
The pattern of difference in differences coefficients are both very similar to those in 
Table 3, though the coefficients estimated on the much smaller set of practices with 
poor data quality providers are not significant.  
4.4.3 Alternative  practice population estimates 
We estimated the difference in difference models using the alternative population 
measure which has the advantage of being adjusted for list inflation but the 
disadvantage of being available for only one year so that the same population had to 
be applied to four years of admissions to produce admission rates.  As the OLS and 
FE results in the last four models in Table 8 show, the population adjustment makes 
very little difference to the results.  
 
  285 Conclusions 
Using a large sample of most English general practices and adopting a difference in 
difference methodology to address selection bias, this study offers clear evidence that 
the policy of GP fundholding exerted downward pressure on secondary care 
admissions for elective surgery. Our estimates suggest that elective surgical 
admissions amongst the practices that chose to become fundholders was about 3.3% 
lower than they would have been in the absence of fundholding.   
 
There was considerable heterogeneity in the response to the opportunities offered by 
fundholding amongst general practices.  Over the seven years in which it was possible 
to become a fundholder nearly half (49%) of our practices chose not to do so.   
Fundholders differed from non-fundholders in both observed and unobserved 
characteristics. After allowing for a wide range of observable practice characteristics, 
the conditional mean elective admission rate for fundholders in 1997/8  was 5.6% less 
than for non-fundholders. 57% of this difference was due the incentive effects of 
fundholding but 43% arose from unobserved differences between the characteristics 
of fundholding and non-fundholding practices.   
 
There was also considerable heterogeneity amongst practices that chose to become 
fundholders with the incentive effect of fundholding leading to a reduction in 
admission rates of 6.2% for wave 1 to 4 fundholders compared with a reduction of 
only 1.2 % for wave 5 to 7 fundholders.   
 
We found no evidence that fundholding led to the substitution of emergency 
admissions for electives. There were no significant differences between the admission 
rates of fundholders and nonfundholders nor between the changes in their admission 
rates.  
 
We believe that we have produced a robust answer to one of the major questions in an 
assessment of the fundholding experiment and have shown that gatekeeping practices 
will reduce their elective admissions by modest but not negligible amounts when 
confronted with a budget and explicit prices.  The results have implications for the 
  29new budgetary arrangements in the NHS and, given that gatekeeping is widespread in 
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  31Data Appendix 
 
Admissions 
Annual data on admissions at NHS Trusts were taken from Hospital Episode Statistics 
for 1997/8 to 2000/1 for consultant episodes which finished in each year. There were 
about 11.7M episodes in total in 2000/1. We used the episodes for all procedures in a 
number of main specialities: General Surgery, Urology, Trauma and Orthopaedics, 
Ear, Nose and Throat, Ophthalmology, Oral surgery, Restorative dentistry, 
Orthodontics, Gynaecology.  In these specialities most procedures were covered by 
the fundholding scheme.  We distinguish between elective or booked admissions 
(which would have been charged to the fundholder for fundholding procedures) and 
non-elective or emergency admissions, which would not have been charged to 
fundholders. The 3M elective and 1.25M non-elective surgical episodes per year in 
the specialities were aggregated to practice level. 
 
Populations 
Data on practice populations (total and by age and sex groups) were taken from the 
PCT database at the National Primary Care Research and Development Centre 
(http://www.primary-care-db.org.uk/) for each of the four years and used to calculate 
crude admission rates for each practice for elective and non-elective surgery.  Because 
of delays in removing patients who die or move from lists these data suffer from list 
inflation. We also had list inflation corrected population data for one year (2000/1) 
from the AREA database (Sutton et al, 2002) which deflated practice populations by 
applying separate age, sex and local authority specific correction factors to practice 
populations.   
 
Waiting times 
The waiting time (the difference between the date of the elective procedure and the 
date the patient was placed on the elective waiting list) was available from HES for 
each patient admitted as an elective patient. The waiting time for each practice for 
each year was calculated as the mean elective wait for its patients admitted as 
electives in the year (mean and median waiting times were very similar). 
 
  32Practice characteristics 
The fundholding status and wave of fundholding for each practice were derived from 
lookup tables from the NHS Operational Codes Service.  We had data on practice 
characteristics for 1999, based on the Department of Health’s General Medical 
Statistics, from the NPCRDC website. They included GP age, sex, country of 
qualification, numbers of GPs, whether GPs were approved trainers, whether the 
practice was in receipt of quality payments, and whether the practice offered different 
types of clinics.  
 
Practice patient characteristics 
In addition to the age and sex composition of the practice populations, we also had 
information on their socio-economic characteristics.  The main sources of socio-
economic data were the 1991 Census and the components of the Index of Multiple 
Deprivation (DETR 2000) which uses information on Social Security payments in 
1998 and 1999. The data are available at small area (frozen 1998 electoral ward) 
level. They were attributed to practices by taking weighted averages based on the 
proportion of practice populations resident in each ward (from the Department of 
Health’s Attribution Data Set used to calculate the 2000/1 funding allocations to 
HAs).  Some socio-economic data, such as the Low Income Scheme Index (the 
proportion of prescriptions from a practice which were dispensed without charge 




We used data on supply factors from the AREA project (Sutton et al, 2002) including 
distance from practice populations to NHS Trusts, private hospitals, residential and 
nursing homes, numbers of beds and consultants at NHS Trusts.  
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Note: Plot of initial sample of 30422 observations. Lines show practices excluded 
because (a) population under 1000, (b) admissions under 30 and (c) admission rate 
under 200 
 








































Note. Plots coefficients from population averaged within and between models. Error 
bars are 95% confidence intervals. For 1998/9, 1999/2000 and 2000/1 they are 






  37Figure 4.  Annual difference between fundholder and non-fundholder elective 




















































  38Table 1.  Variable definitions and summary statistics 
 
Variable            Definition Years Source Mean  Std. Dev.   Max  Min
Admission rate
*   Elective admission rate   1997/8 – 2000/01  HES/GMS  60.334 19.847 192.481 2.002 
Fundholder  GP fundholding status in 1997/8  1997/8  OCS  0.513  
Waiting time
*   Average inpatient waiting time (days)  1997/8 – 2000/01  HES  110.177 27.224 264.063 33.409 
Practice pop
*   List size of practice  1997/8 – 2000/01  GMS/ NPRDC  6089.470 3706.128 34044 1005 
List per GP
*  List size per GP   1997/8 – 2000/01  GMS/ NPRDC  1985.671 565.392 6918 515.750 
Male GPs  Proportion of male GPs    1999/00  GMS/NPRDC  0.714 0.272 1 0 
UK qualified GPs  Proportion GPs qualified in UK  1999/00  GMS/NPRDC  0.699 0.412 1 0 
GPs over  50  Proportion of GPs aged  over 50   1999/00  GMS/NPRDC  0.375 0.383 1 0 
Minor surgery GPs  Proportion of GPs performing minor surgery  1999/00  GMS/NPRDC  0.750 0.372 1 0 
Single GP practice  Practice had one GP   1999/00  GMS/NPRDC  0.243  
Training practice  Practice has approved training status  1999/00  GMS/NPRDC  0.268  
Dispensing practice  Practice can dispense pharmaceuticals  1999/00  GMS/NPRDC  0.144  
Access NHS  Beds weighted distance to secondary care    2000  OCS/AREA  2.801 0.828 5.527 0.355 
Distance private  Distance from practice to nearest 5 private hospitals   2000  OCS/AREA  22.891 10.116 98.989 10.458 
Consultants  Number of consultants at main acute provider  2000  OCS/AREA  131.139 57.787 391.350 38.262 
Low birthweight  Percentage of babies who were low birthweight
 
         
   
     
   
     
       
1993-1997 ID/AREA 7.506 1.475 12.973 2.523
Over 75 alone  Proportion of over 75s living alone 1991 Census/AREA  0.480 0.048 0.645 0.127
Non white  Proportion from minority ethnic group 1991 Census/AREA  0.079 0.118 0.688 0.000
Rural patients  Proportion of rural patients   1999/00  GMS/NPRDC  0.085 0.174 1 0 
In migration  Proportion migrants from outside Local Authority   1991  Census/AREA  0.040 0.020 0.237 0.007 
Disability allowance  Incapacity/Severe disability allowance claimants 
 
1999  ID/AREA  99.783
 
51.464 434.157 13.772 
Education deprivation  Index of education deprivation 2000 ID/AREA 0.253 0.758 2.792 -2.285
Job seekers   Job seekers allowance   1998 ID/AREA 4.848 3.279 20.550 0.285
Low  income Percentage of prescriptions dispensed with low
income exemption (LISI score) 
  2000 PSU/NPRDC 11.352 7.825 56.455 0.380
* Denotes data available for all four years 1997/8 – 2000/1. All other data is time invariant. For time varying data summary statistics are 
calculated over four years. Data refers either to financial year (e.g. 1997/98) or calendar year (e.g. 2000) and is for the final sample of 7105 
practices. 
  39HES - Hospital Episode Statistics, OCS - Organisational Codes Service, GMS - General Medical Statistics, NPRDC - National Primary Care 




  40Table 2.  Practices by fundholding wave 
 
Wave 
 (first year as fundholder) 
Number of 
practices
% Mean elective admission rate per 1000 
         1997/8  1998/9  1999/2000 2000/1
Wave 1 (1991/2)  250 3.52 52.381  57.617  59.788  60.849 
Wave 2 (1992/3)  217 3.05 52.493  60.446  62.608  62.722 
Wave 3 (1993/4)  544 7.66 55.856  60.730  62.232  63.059 
Wave 4 (1994/5)  552 7.77 53.105  59.435  60.741  60.722 
Wave 5 (1995/6)  365 5.14 51.928  57.589  59.528  57.713 
Wave 6 (1996/7)  1104 15.54 57.005  61.533  63.560  62.390 
Wave 7 (1997/8) 
 
615 8.66 56.906  61.366  61.697  60.776 
     
         
     
         
     
         
    
Total  Fundholders
 
3647 51.33 55.133 60.340 61.902 61.411
Non-fundholders 3458 48.67 56.820 62.776 62.868 61.557
   








  41Table 3. Alternative estimates for elective admissions 
    OLS
 (HA effects) 
OLS 
 (Provider effects)




1998/9    6.6028  6.4020  6.5202  6.4781  6.5202
[27.96]**  [25.70]** [25.44]** [27.76]** [29.39]**
1999/2000 5.7498  5.8481  5.7556  5.8009  5.7556
[20.26]**  [20.32]** [18.70]** [20.72]**
 
[21.60]**
2000/1 4.6978  4.8405  5.2726 4.8694  5.2726
[15.76]**  [16.04]** [15.12]** [16.38]** [17.47]**
Fundholder -3.0778  -3.3459    -2.5258  -3.4399
[8.53]** [9.22]** [6.99]** [9.57]**
Diff in diff 98/99 – 97/98
 
-0.6387 -0.4421 -0.5408 -0.6556 -0.5408
[2.05]*  [1.38] [1.59] [2.12]* [1.84]
Diff in diff 99/00 – 97/98 
 
1.0915  1.1222  1.2704  1.0426  1.2704 
[2.88]**  [2.95]** [3.06]** [2.77]** [3.53]**
Diff in diff 00/01 – 97/98  1.8441  2.0489  1.9573  1.7777  1.9573 
[4.68]** [5.22]** [4.39]** [4.54]** [5.08]**
Waiting time  -0.0847  -0.0552  -0.0564  -0.0679  -0.0564 
[13.07]** [7.59]** [7.98]** [12.13]** [9.22]**
Mean wait over 4 years 
 
        -0.1120 
  [10.31]**
Practice pop  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0069  -0.0007  -0.0069 
[6.08]**  [6.50]** [18.96]** [12.98]** [21.90]**
Mean pop over 4 years 
 
        -0.0001 
  [3.19]**
List per GP  -0.0007  -0.0009  -0.0015  -0.0016  -0.0015 
[2.74]** [3.63]** [3.87]** [6.11]** [4.47]**
Mean list per GP over 4 years          -0.0001 
       
   
       
   
       
   
           
           
       
       
           
           
       
       
       
           
  42           [0.18]
Male GPs  1.6245  1.4862    2.6788  1.0826 
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
     
           
           
           
           
           
[2.99]** [2.79]** [4.80]** [1.97]*
GPs over 50  -1.3080  -1.4081    -1.2926  -1.3268 
[2.82]** [3.16]** [2.75]** [2.87]**
UK qualified GPs  1.0397  0.9651    1.6225  0.8247 
[2.24]* [2.12]* [3.43]** [1.78]
Minor surgery GPs  -1.3578  -1.5863    -1.3015  -1.3565 
[2.90]** [3.51]** [2.74]** [2.91]**
Single GP practice  -1.1248  -0.9573    -2.1566  -0.9712 
[2.66]** [2.30]* [5.02]** [2.24]*
Training practice  -0.6037  -0.3584    0.2777  -0.8617 
[2.01]* [1.21] [0.90] [2.88]**
Dispensing practice  -1.1069  -0.9900    -1.1981  -1.0925 
[2.20]* [1.96]* [2.32]* [2.20]*
Access NHS  1.2106  2.4463    1.2544  1.2015 
[2.95]** [5.25]** [3.06]** [2.92]**
Distance private  0.0838  0.0211    0.0846  0.0842 
[2.68]** [0.44] [2.67]** [2.71]**
Consultants -0.0248  0.0209   -0.0254  -0.0241
[4.62]** [2.71]** [4.64]** [4.51]**
Low birthweight  0.4554  0.3455    0.4728  0.4576 
[2.85]** [2.04]* [2.92]** [2.88]**
Over 75 alone  -10.0816  0.5294    -10.0125  -9.4979 
[2.21]* [0.12] [2.17]* [2.07]*
Non white  -6.3815  -8.1689    -5.9712  -6.5894 
[2.89]** [3.32]** [2.66]** [2.95]**
Rural patients  -6.5350  -4.5867    -7.3383  -6.2325 
[5.69]** [3.83]** [6.25]** [5.47]**
  43In migration  -105.9429  -68.6248    -110.0454  -105.9887 
[9.76]** [5.95]** [9.88]** [9.75]**
Disability allowance  0.0481  0.0609    0.0493  0.0485 
[6.16]** [6.93]** [6.24]** [6.23]**
Educ Deprivation   3.4510  4.3874    3.2686  3.5582 
[10.82]** [13.43]** [10.05]** [11.18]**
Job seekers   -0.9839  -1.1419    -0.9729  -1.0198 
[8.03]** [8.62]** [7.89]** [8.31]**
Low income  0.5207  0.4548    0.4892  0.5333 
[8.01]** [7.16]** [7.40]** [8.22]**




Constant 41.273  17.9952  56.794 8.806  78.9957
[1.54]  [0.66] [1.92] [0.41]  [1.93]
  R2 0.57  0.60 0.84
Observations  7105 x 4  6776 x 4 
 
7105 x 4 
 
7105 x 4  7105 x 4 
 
           
           
           
           
           
           
   
       
       
     
 
Dependent variable: crude elective admission rate. Practice age/gender proportions included. All estimators use robust standard errors and 
clustering within practices.  
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Table 4.  Fundholder wave effects 
  
Fundholder wave 
(first year as fundholder) 
Fundholder 
effect 97/98 
Diff in diff 
 98/99 – 97/98 
Diff in diff 
 99/00 – 97/98 
Diff in diff 
 00/01 – 97/98 
Incentive 
effect % 
Wave 1 (1991/2)  -5.4989  -0.3182  2.2695  3.7789  6.55 







Wave 2 (1992/3) 
 
-5.1619  2.0825  4.7407  5.4399  9.13 
  [4.43]**  [2.14]*  [3.98]**  [4.08]**
Wave 3 (1993/4) 
 
-4.2685  -0.7592  1.2915  3.0507  5.05 
  [6.70]**  [1.52]  [2.03]*  [4.25]**
Wave 4 (1994/5) 
 
-5.1602  0.8112  2.4722  3.4598  5.91 
  [7.68]**  [1.44]  [3.66]**  [4.73]**
Wave 5 (1995/6) 
 
-4.3623  -0.1021  2.0938  1.8739  3.31 
  [5.55]**  [0.16]  [2.67]**  [2.19]*
Wave 6 (1996/7) 
 
-2.9001  -1.2494  0.8525  1.1144  1.82 
  [5.61]**  [3.00]**  [1.66]  [2.02]*
Wave 7 (1997/8) 
 
-0.7745  -1.5449  -1.1161  -0.6742  -1.12 
  [1.15]  [2.55]*  [1.62]  [0.95]
Dependent variable: crude elective admission rate. Within and between population averaged estimates with robust standard errors and clustering.  
Same set of covariates as model 5, Table 3.   Incentive effect: - (diff in diff 00/01-97/98)/(mean elective admission rate 1997/8 to 2000/1 for 
fundholdersof relevant wave) 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 5.  Elective and non-elective admissions  
 
            Non-elective   Non-elective Elective
OLS FE PA    SUR  SUR
1998/99             1.029 1.142 1.071 0.971 6.516
[8.27]** [8.32]** [8.70]** [6.55]** [20.88]**










  2000/01 1.678 1.689 1.650 1.525 4.494
[11.62]** [10.21]** [11.52]** [10.26]** [14.37]**
FH – NFH 1997/98  -0.265    -0.077    -0.285  -2.992 
[1.54] [0.45] [1.91] [9.50]**
Diff in diff 98/99 – 97/98 -0.224 -0.139 -0.215 -0.197 -0.682
[1.38] [0.78] [1.33] [0.96] [1.57]
Diff in diff 99/00 – 97/98  0.104  0.292  0.134    0.160  1.042 
[0.56] [1.41] [0.73] [0.78] [2.40]*
Diff in diff 00/01 – 97/98  0.139  0.296  0.157    0.190  1.787 
[0.74] [1.39] [0.84] [0.92] [4.12]**
Waiting time   -0.009  -0.017  -0.014    -0.010  -0.083 
[2.93]** [5.36]** [5.65]** [4.91]** [19.22]**
Practice pop  -0.00015  -0.00028  -0.00027    -0.00014  -0.00029 
[8.86]** [15.92]** [13.20]** [12.82]** [10.45]**




Male  GPs 0.801 0.992 0.744 1.657
[3.25]** [3.96]** [4.62]** [4.86]**
GPs over 51            -1.006 
[4.49]**
       
            
          
            
   
            
            
             
            
            
            
            
            
            
          
            
           
  46UK qualified GPs             1.670 
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
            
           
            
             
     
         
            
          
            
           
            
            
     
            
[7.16]**
Minor  surgery -1.197
[5.27]**
Single GP practice            -1.287 
[6.11]**
Training  practice -0.654
[3.89]**
Dispensing  practice -1.322
[5.10]**
Access NHS   1.5869    1.6521    1.5413  1.1124 
[9.64]** [10.07]** [14.87]** [4.65]**
Distance private             0.086 
[5.17]**
Consultants   -0.009    -0.009    -0.008  -0.024 
[3.79]** [3.72]** [5.01]** [7.15]**












In migration  -17.039    -18.050    -16.195  -105.815 
[3.64]** [3.76]** [4.64]** [14.32]**
  Low  birthweight 0.276 0.283 0.285 0.400
[3.84]** [3.91]** [5.99]** [3.98]**
Over 75 alone            -8.065 
[3.48]**








  Education  deprivation 0.901 0.849 0.907 3.357
[5.94]** [5.57]** [9.28]** [16.27]**
  47Job seekers  -0.367    -0.367    -0.374  -1.003 
             
             
            
            
            
           
[6.24]** [6.25]** [10.55]** [13.25]**
Low income   0.257    0.257    0.254  0.543 
[8.22]** [8.08]** [12.81]** [12.92]**
LISI income squared  -0.003    -0.004    -0.003  -0.013 
[4.12]** [4.43]** [7.05]** [13.99]**
Constant 11.705 46.864 9.396 9.056 31.010
[0.92] [3.13]** [0.89] [1.03] [1.68]
R-squared 0.46 0.78
Observations  7113 x 4   7113 x 4  7113 x 4    7052 x 4  7052 x 4 
 
Dependent variables: crude practice admission rate. Practice age/gender proportions included. HA effects in OLS models. All estimators use 
robust standard errors and clustering within practices.  




  48Table 6.  Effect of number of practices in HA and PCT 
 1997/8  2000/1 
Fundholder   -2.431  -1.402 
  [2.51]*     -1.74    
Practices in PCO  -175.5  -18.96 
  [0.57]      [-1.39]   
Fundholder × Practices in PCO  -76.1 -5.91 
  [0.95]      [-0.44]   
Constant  68.021     79.640   
  [1.18]     [1.67]    
R2 0.60  0.681 
Observations 6771  6771 
Dependent variable: crude practice elective admission rate. Separate OLS cross 
sections estimated with robust SEs and clustering within HAs (1997/8) or PCTs 
(2000/1).  Models also include all covariates in Table 3. 
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Table 7.  Effect of dropping observations  
 
  (1)          (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exclusions:  None  Pop < 1000 (2) + Admissions < 30 (3) + Adm Rate > 200/1000  (4) + no LISI score 
1998/9            5.6069 6.4439 6.6330 6.5285 6.5202
[1.50]  [23.65]**  [25.25]**
 
[25.46]** [25.44]**
1999/2000 10.9248  7.3489 5.8261 5.7820 5.7556
[2.23]*  [19.24]**  [18.46]**
 
[18.75]** [18.70]**
2000/1 21.4979  7.1142 5.4267 5.2625 5.2726
[2.97]**  [16.80]**  [15.28]** [15.10]** [15.12]**
Diff in diff 98/99 – 97/98 -0.3338 -0.9327 -0.6905 -0.5841 -0.5408
 [0.09]  [2.51]*  [1.89]     
     
         
         
[1.72] [1.59]
Diff in diff 99/00 – 97/98 
 
3.3086  0.1390 
 
1.0964  1.2014  1.2704 
[0.76] [0.28]  [2.55]* [2.89]** [3.06]**
Diff in diff 00/01 – 97/98  1.6192  1.1388  1.7735  1.9086  1.9573 
  [0.36] [2.11]* [3.86]** [4.29]** [4.39]**
Wait  0.0365 -0.0045 -0.0573 -0.0560 -0.0564
  [1.05]         
       
         
         
         
           
         
[0.50] [7.93]** [7.98]** [7.98]**
Practice pop  -0.0156  -0.0082  -0.0084  -0.0066  -0.0069 
[2.92]**  [7.52]**  [7.54]** [15.67]** [18.96]**
List per GP  -0.0249 -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0015 -0.0015
  [2.15]* [1.52] [1.81] [3.93]** [3.87]**
Constant 2797.5179  48.8785 76.6553 51.9438 56.7940
[0.96] [1.37] [2.34]* [1.75] [1.92]
Observations   (7605 x 4) + (1 x 2) 7505 x 4 
 
7165 x 4  7151 x 4  7105 x 4 
R2 0.74 0.82 0.85 0.84 0.84
       
       
       
       
       
           
Dependent variable: crude admission rate. Practice age/gender proportions included. Fixed effects with robust standard errors and clustering of 
errors within practices.  *significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
  50Table 8.  Robustness to quality of admission data and to alternative measures of practice population 
 
  Quality of admission data  Practice population measures 












1998/9              6.9176 6.7775  6.6752 7.0714 6.5889 6.9208 6.5308  6.7222
[28.51]**  [25.97]** [10.18]** [20.62]**  [27.82]** [31.24]** [25.47]** [26.18]**
1999/2000 6.4071 6.2508 6.5775 6.0583 5.7540 5.2482 5.7842 5.3839
[21.40]**  [19.43]** [7.35]** [14.97]**  [20.24]** [20.19]** [18.76]** [18.00]**
2000/1 5.4880 5.8919 7.1153 5.5004 4.6901 4.7663 5.2911 4.9127
[17.31]**  [16.16]** [5.40]** [12.07]**  [15.67]** [16.48]** [15.15]** [14.79]**
Fundholder -3.2261 -3.0935 -2.5271
  [8.89]**              
             
           
           
                 
[8.55]** [6.20]**







[1.80] [1.46] [1.15] [1.02] [1.96]* [2.31]* [1.57] [2.11]*
Diff in diff 99/00 – 97/98 
 
1.2243  1.3503  1.7160  1.2737  1.1051  1.3054  1.2587  1.1960 
[3.20]**  [3.23]** [1.54] [2.25]*  [2.91]** [3.64]** [3.02]** [2.89]**
Diff in diff 00/01 – 97/98  2.1266  2.1446  1.8977  1.9864  1.8727  1.8750  1.9587  1.7707 
[5.36]** [4.79]** [1.22] [3.33]** [4.74]** [4.73]** [4.39]** [3.87]**
Admission data quality  -4.9785  -3.6268             
  [10.03]**  [8.44]**          
   
                 
       
Constant 42.5102  55.0930  43.0075  33.5038  42.7762  -312.5612  57.9674  63.2951
[1.58] [1.87] [0.27] [1.03] [1.60] [3.05]** [1.95] [79.24]**
  R2 0.57  0.84 0.89 0.85  0.57  0.55  0.84 0.85
Observations  7004 x 4  7004 x 4  1620 x 4  5384 x 4  7079 x 4  7079 x 4  7079 x 4  7079 x 4 
       
             
                 
             
                 
             
                
 
Dependent variable: crude elective admission rate. All estimates with robust standard errors and clustering.  Models also included the same 
variables as the corresponding models in Table 3. Practice age/sex proportions also included. HA effects in OLS model. See text for definition of 
data quality index.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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